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"The Devil is in the details."
- Anon
I. INTRODUCTION
Environmental lawyers are already blessed with several excellent
summary overviews of the Clean Air Act (CAA).' As useful as these
general roadmaps are, however, every practicing environmental lawyer
knows that "the devil is in the details." For every statutory section, the
administrative rules and regulations are at least an order of magnitude more
complex than the statute itself; beneath the rules lie numerous
interpretations, caveats, exceptions, guidance documents, regulatory
preambles, agency manuals, letter rulings, policies, precedents, and
manifold other administrative utterances. These administrative
constructions and interpretations add at least another hundredfold to a
thousandfold of additional detail.' Together the multiple levels of
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F. William Brownell, Clean Air Act, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 72
(Thomas F.P. Sullivan ed., 14th ed. 1997); Theodore L. Garrett & Sonya D. Winner, A
Clean Air Act Primer, Part 1, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,159 (Mar. 1992).
2 For an overview of the various types of administrative actions and their differing
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administrative law-making form a vast interpretative pyramid of stunning
detail and complexity that translates "law at the wholesale level" (the goal
proclaimed in the statute) into "law at the retail level" (the specific,
enforceable dictates to a regulated entity).
The reality of environmental law practice today takes place deep down
in the interpretative pyramid, not in the statutes and regulations at its apex.
Following the Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC decision,3 no competent
environmental lawyer would dare to advise a client based upon the wording
of the statute alone. In the post-Chevron era, the issue in advising a client
is no longer what the words of the statute seem to say, but what the agency
has said that they say, and whether that administrative construction is within
the broad parameters of agency discretion defined by Chevron.'
Until now, Clean Air lawyers have lacked a reference that goes
beneath the statute and regulatory apex into the nitty-gritty of regulatory
interpretations. The Clean Air Act Handbook fills this void admirably.
Edited by two former CAA staff attorneys at EPA's Office of General
Counsel (EPA/OGC), Robert Martineau and David Novello, The Clean Air
Act Handbook guides us several levels deeper into the vast legal and
regulatory thicket that is the CAA.
This 587-page book is about as good as it gets in its field. Twenty
chapters, each written by an expert in a facet of the CAA, set out succinct
and lucid explanations of how each program works, and at least a brief
overview of the key administrative interpretations. The real treasures for
lawyers, however, are the footnotes at the back of each chapter. The
footnotes are an invaluable guide to the key administrative interpretative
documents and preambles, which are an important source of law, but are
often hard to find. No one practicing seriously in the CAA field can afford
to be without this book.
Part II of this Review surveys a few of the highlights, and identifies
some of the outstanding strengths and weaknesses of The Clean Air Act
Handbook. Part Hm provides a brief analysis of the sources of legal
complexity in environmental law that make a book like The Clean Air Act
Handbook a necessity. Finally, Part IV offers some speculation regarding
the future of this genre of legal publishing.
juridical consequences, see generally Peter Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DuKE
L.J. 1463 (1992).
' Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see also Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial
Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and
Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071 (1990).
4 See Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 866.
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In general, the limits of The Clean Air Act Handbook are the limits of
its genre, a book printed using a 500-year old technology of paper, ink and
printing press. It is expensive, over $120 in paperback! In addition, it was
outdated by continuing regulatory developments even before it was
published-and it becomes more obsolete with each passing day and issue
of the Federal Register. For these reasons, The Clean Air Act Handbook
may be the "Last Great Clean Air Book." No printed book can really keep
up with the constantly changing details of CAA implementation, nor any of
the other fast-evolving areas of environmental law. This Review ends with
speculation on how the development of the Internet may change the field of
specialized legal publishing.
II. HIGHLIGHTS, STRENGTHS, AND WEAKNESSES
Excellent as The Clean Air Act Handbook is, the book does have its
limitations. As with every book written by multiple authors, there is some
variation in quality among the chapters in The Clean Air Act Handbook.
One of the best chapters is Vickie Patton's "The Visibility Protection
Program."'5 Ms. Patton, a former EPA/OGC staff attorney who recently
joined the Environmental Defense Fund, explains the complex history of
the visibility protection requirements of the CAA with admirable clarity and
perspicacity. Her account is particularly noteworthy because of her talent
in capturing significant details without overwhelming the reader with
irrelevancies.
Visibility protection is clearly one of the "sizzling sleepers"6 of the
CAA, as the recent controversy surrounding EPA's development of
"regional haze" rules illustrates.7 The underlying problem, which Ms.
Patton alludes to at least indirectly, is the seemingly absolute commands of
Congress to protect visibility in the CAA Amendments of 1977.
Administration after administration has squirmed, pettifogged, creatively
construed, and avoided taking decisive, nationwide action to protect
visibility. This reluctance is at least partially attributable to a perceived lack
- Vickie L. Patton, The Visibility Protection Program, in THE CLEAN AIR ACT
HANDBOOK 157 (Robert J. Martineau & David P. Novello eds., 1998).
6 Cf. Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in
Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U.
L. REV. 277, 281 (1990) (noting that the use of legislative history in interpreting statutes
is under "aggressive assault" by the textualists on the U.S. Supreme Court).
' EPA Staff Consider Revising Performance Targets in Regional Haze Rule, INSIDE
E.P.A., Feb. 6, 1998, at 7, 12.
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of political support for a multi-billion dollar program to protect against haze
in the National Parks and other sensitive ecological areas, despite the
statutory language to the contrary. Eventually the seeming contradiction
between strong statutory language and weak political support will have to
be resolved.
There are a few heroic moments in the otherwise dismal history of
visibility protection. One great success story, which Ms. Patton relates with
admirable clarity, accuracy, and balance, is the 1991 negotiation among
environmentalists and industry, facilitated by EPA, that resulted in
successful controls on the huge Navajo Power Station. These controls
ameliorate visibility problems in Grand Canyon National Park. As Ms.
Patton rightly describes, this episode was truly a great success story for
negotiating rules. Typically, EPA had proposed three alternatives to
address the visibility problems in the Park: (1) do nothing; (2) require a
modest seventy percent reduction in sulfur dioxide (SO 2) emissions, that
was favored by industry but opposed by environmentalists; or (3) require a
ninety percent reduction in S02 emissions, that was favored by
environmentalists, but opposed by industry because of the associated costs.
Rather than decide among these stark alternatives, EPA Assistant
Administrator for Air and Radiation, Bill Rosenberg, a devotee of what the
Bush Administration called "negotiated rulemaking" and the Clinton
Administration now calls "stakeholder participation," got the interested
parties together for a dialogue outside of the artificial atmosphere of written
comments and stating formal positions on the record.9 As predicted by the
8 Sulfur dioxide "converts to visibility-impairing sulfates through transformation in
the atmosphere .... " Patton, supra note 4, at 171.
' E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492-93 (1992),
observing that:
No administrator in Washington turns to full-scale notice-and-comment
rulemaking when she is genuinely interested in obtaining input from interested
parties. Notice-and-comment rulemaking is to public participation as Japanese
Kabuki theater is to human passions-a highly stylized process for displaying
in a formal way the essence of something which in real life takes place in other
venues. To secure the genuine reality, rather than a formal show, of public
participation, a variety of techniques is available-from informal meetings
with trade associations and other constituency groups, to roundtables, to
floating "trial balloons" in speeches or leaks to the trade press, to the more




academic literature on negotiation,' ° real dialogue among the interested
parties about their interests, rather than their stated positions, led to
identification of a new win-win alternative that had been previously
overlooked by EPA. Although it did not really agree with EPA's technical
case asserting that the plant caused significant adverse effects on visibility
in the Grand Canyon, industry grudgingly acknowledged the need for
additional controls. Industry was not opposed to the ninety percent control
option per se or on principle; it was just that it was too expensive because
it would have required a back-up emission control system. The options
under consideration used a thirty day averaging time. If one of the primary
control systems failed, there wouldn't be enough time to mitigate any
excess emissions resulting from system failure, by over-control, after the
system was operational. It turned out that ninety percent control with a
longer averaging time was actually cheaper than seventy percent control
with the averaging time originally proposed by EPA. That approach, one
which EPA had never considered, was finally adopted with the support of
all concerned. Like all good settlements, it was probably one that all the
parties walked away from a little unhappy, or in more formal terms, it was
an acceptable second-best solution for all concerned." It has recently
become popular among some academics to denigrate negotiation among
interested parties of administrative rules.' 2 The Grand Canyon case, as
described by Ms. Patton, is a concrete example of how and why the process
can work to identify creative, win-win approaches that would have been
overlooked by the Agency if left to its own devices.
Another especially fine chapter is one by co-editor Robert Martineau
on the new system for regulating air toxics under section 112 of the CAA,
established by the CAA Amendments of 1990. This complex structure is
explained with admirable clarity and simplicity by Martineau. He also
describes with great insight many of EPA' s early interpretations of section
10 Louis FIsHER & WILtAM USEY, GETTING TO YES (1981) (summarizing in popular
form the results of many years of study of the negotiating process by the Harvard
Negotiation Project).
" See generally E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The
Federalization of Environmental Law, I J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313 (1985) (explaining the
importance of the credible threat of something worse in motivating parties toward their
second-best preferences).
12 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at
Regulatory Negotiation, 43 DuKE L.J. 1206, 1219-20 (1994); see also Cary Coglianese,
Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DuKE
L.J. 1255, 1335-36 (1997).
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112-many of which he was involved in as the responsible EPA/OGC staff
attorney-and their implications for the future.
Other particularly strong chapters are "Regulation of Fuels and Fuel
Additives" by Jonathan Martel,13 "The Acid Rain Program" by Jill Grant,
4
and "Overview of the Title V Operating Permit Program" by co-editor
David Novello.1
5
At the opposite end of the spectrum, in my opinion, is the introductory
chapter on the history of the CAA. For example, we are told with wide-
eyed simplicity that: "World history provides examples of air pollution
problems ever since the roots of civilization. People probably complained
about the smoke as soon as man invented fire. For CAA practitioners, it is
often illuminating and helpful to find earlier examples of current
problems.' 16 But nowhere are we really told what all this "history" is
supposed to mean, and what conclusions to draw from it.
Overall, the book is heavy on practical details and light on theory or
policy recommendations. This is not a book for academic lawyers looking
for a new overarching theory of why the CAA is as it is, or creative ideas
about how it might be improved. It is, rather, a treatise for lawyers
interested in understanding how the various programs under the CAA
actually work. No work that I know of does a better job of performing the
limited but important mission of leading the uninitiated through the
circuitous byways of one of the most complex areas of environmental law.
III. LEGAL COMPLEXITY IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: WHY
THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK IS AN ESSENTIAL
REFERENCE
Perhaps the central defining feature of environmental law in the United
States is its mind-numbing complexity and detail. A decade ago I used to
argue with my tax colleagues about whether tax law or environmental law
was more complicated. They gave up long ago; we won-or lost! Today
there is no serious question that environmental law is the most complicated
"3 Jonathan S. Martel, Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives, in THE CLEAN AIR ACr
HANDBOOK 299 (Robert J. Martineau & David P. Novello eds., 1998).
" Jill E. Grant, The Acid Rain Program, in THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK 369
(Robert J. Martineau & David P. Novello eds., 1998).
5 David P. Novello, Overview of the Title V Operating Permit Program, in THE CLEAN
AIR ACT HANDBOOK 444 (Robert J. Martineau & David P. Novello eds., 1998).
16 Michael R. Barr, Introduction to the Clean Air Act: History and Perspective, in THE
CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK 1,4 (Robert J. Martineau & David P. Novello eds., 1998).
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and detailed body of law the world has ever known; we have won the
(dubious) distinction of representing the "state of the art" in legal
complexity and detail. Hence, we are badly in need of works like The
Clean Air Act Handbook to help us master the basics in our own field.
The complexity and detail typical of late 20th century environmental
law in the United States far surpasses the limits of the individual human
mind. It is said that Aristotle was the last human being who knew
everything; implying, I think, not only that Aristotle was exceedingly
intelligent, but also that as human knowledge continued to develop and
expand, it exceeded the cognitive capacities of any human being - even an
Aristotle. In the same vein, no one is really an "environmental lawyer" any
more; we are air lawyers, or water lawyers, or Superfund lawyers. The field
has simply gotten too large and complex for anyone to master it all.
Nowhere is this trend toward subspecialization within environmental
law more evident than in the Office of General Counsel (OGC) at EPA. No
one understands the details of a particular little comer of environmental law
better than an EPA/OGC attorney, except perhaps former EPA/OGC
attorneys now in private practice, like those who contributed to The Clean
Air Act Handbook. This was first brought home to me soon after I became
EPA General Counsel in 1989. Four EPA/OGC attorneys were briefing me
about new proposals implementing section 304(1) of the Clean Water Act.
As an academic, schooled in the principle of Dworkinian narrative
consistency, 7 I quite naturally asked if what they were telling me about
section 304(l) fit together with what I had heard the day before about
section 304(m). There was a momentary hesitation followed by an uneasy
silence in the room as they looked from one to another. Finally, one of
them said, we're the section 304(1) team; if you want to know about section
304(m) you'll have to call in another lawyer in the office.
Only at OGC do environmental lawyers have the luxury-and also the
curse-of specializing not just in a particular statute, not just a particular
statutory section, but in particular statutory subsections! No one
understands the "details," the particular legislative, regulatory and judicial
history of particular environmental law programs in the depth that
EPA/OGC attorneys do. Of course, like the heroes in Greek tragedy, that
is both their heroic strength and also their fatal flaw.
'" See RONALD DwORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
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Increasing complexity and detail in environmental law is not all bad.'8
The most effective, advanced systems of environmental law
worldwide-the Dutch, the German, the American, and perhaps the
Japanese-share at least one essential, common characteristic; each of them
features an institutional means of translating the high level political
pronouncements of legislation ("thou shalt not pollute") into facility-
specific, verifiable, quantitative limits on emissions that are enforceable.
The systems differ widely in how they translate broad legislative goals
("law at the wholesale level") into specific, quantitative limits on
technically-measurable emissions ("law at the retail level"), but they all
have some effective means of doing so. 9
In contrast, environmental law systems around the world that are not
effectively enforced (such as the Russian and Polish), often remain vague,
unspecific hortatory commands. For this reason, I am generally
unsympathetic with Professor David Schoenbrod's suggestion that the U.S.
environmental statutes should be "rules" statutes, actually stating the "law
8 See generally Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93
YALE L.J. 65 (1983) (achieving the optimal degree of regulatory precision through tradeoffs
between the values of transparency (understandability), accessibility (ease of application),
and congruency with policy purposes and at the cost of great complexity).
'9 Some systems of environmental law, like the Anglo-American common law system
of nuisance, solve the information-cost problem of tailoring environmental law to particular
situations by creating specificity ex post rather than ex ante. Thus, a common law system
enunciates broad general principles like "reasonableness" through precedents and only
translates them into facility-specific implications ex post through retroactive, case-by-case
application. Common law economizes on the information costs of translating high-level
pronouncements into facility-specific applications by only tailoring rules to particular
situations reactively. See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN
LAW (1984) (describing common law as "reactive" versus the "proactive" administrative
state). Of course, individual lawyers advising their clients about common law requirements
may also be viewed as part of the legal system and they may be asked to give specific
advice. However, common law systems generally have far less information content in their
official legal pronouncements to form the basis of lawyers' legal advice than do
administrative regulatory systems, which strive to create greater specificity ex ante through
detailed regulations and guidance documents. Depending on the structure of the
background incentives-such as burden of proof, likelihood of enforcement, and magnitude
of penalties, which determine the expected costs of errors in prediction in one direction as
opposed to the other-the relative paucity of information in common law systems may
either create broad deterrence and in terrorem effects, or under-enforcement due to
vagueness. See generally E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Defenses/Enforcing Standards:
The Next Stage of the Tort Revolution?, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1069 (1991) (based on the
Pfizer Distinguished Lecture in Tort Law on Nov. 29, 1990).
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at the retail level" that applies to polluters.2' It would, I believe, far exceed
the institutional capacity of Congress to devise enforceable pollution control
rules that could apply to the vast variations in American industry. Thus,
part of the genius of U.S. environmental law is the law-making apparatus
that I described as an interpretative pyramid at the beginning of this
Review-the conceptual pyramid contains high level congressional
commands at the top, descending through informal rulemaking and
guidance, to case-by-case administrative interpretations, down into state-
level applications, and even into facility-specific implementing rules. This
pyramidal structure piles levels of interpretation on top of one another to
descend from high-level commands Schoenbrod's "goals,"2 to eventually
translate them into very specific, enforceable requirements than can be
inspected and enforced against individual polluters.
Another major source of complexity in U.S. environmental law is the
search for political acceptability. 22 In my experience, many, if not most,
complex distinctions in environmental rules are the fossilized evidence of
a past political deal. Typically, one interested stakeholder group gets the
result it wanted most in a certain area, and another stakeholder group gets
the result it wanted in another area, even if the two results are logically
inconsistent (thus provoking the term "unholy compromise"). These
stakeholders groups are not necessarily external to EPA, but often consist
of offices or even informal groups within offices, that attach a high degree
of importance to a particular policy in a particular area.
One of the great strategic insights of all time was Baron von
Clausewitz's theory that a numerically inferior force could defeat a
numerically superior force by concentrating its efforts in a particular area
of the line to create local superiority.2 3 In the same way, interest groups
that lack sufficient force to globally prevail in efforts to get an entire rule
rewritten to their liking can often can prevail by confining their demands to
20 See generally, DAVID SHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY (1993)
(arguing against delegating lawmaking to administrative agencies); see also David
Schoenbrod, Goal Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act, 30 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 740 (1983).
2 Shoenbrod, supra note 20, at 767-68.
22 See Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences and Cures,
42, 25-39 DUKE L.J. 1 (1992). For a general account of complexity in the law, see
generally id.
2' H. Rothfels, Clausewitz, in MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY: MILITARY THOUGHT
FROM MACHIAVELLI TO HITLER 95, 108 (Edward Mead Earle, ed., 1971) (1943) (noting the
importance of numerical superiority-"first generally, then at the decisive point").
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the narrow issues that they care most about.24 As the process of public
participation and input from interested groups takes place, EPA rules and
interpretations typically become more and more complex; one group after
another gets a little something here and a little something there, each
winning small battles on issues that it cares about more than the other
groups care to oppose. The optimal EPA rule from the standpoint of
political acceptability is one in which there is a little something for
everyone, not a simple, clear-cut victory on every issue for any one interest
group or constituency.
In a sense, the complex lawmaking detailed in The Clean Air Act
Handbook is the residue from thousands of ad hoc political compromises
struck over the years.
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PUBLISHING IN THE
INFORMATION AGE
The Clean Air Act Handbook has flaws, but by and large they are the
flaws inherent in its genre; it is a technical treatise of a rapidly changing
field. The book was outdated--or at least incomplete--on the day its was
published, and it becomes more incomplete as EPA issues new
interpretations and guidance documents. The importance of these on-going
changes varies from area to area. Some of these changes can be easily
anticipated. For example, Bernard Hawkins, author of the chapter "The
New Source Review Program, 25 repeatedly refers to EPA's long-awaited
New Source Review (NSR) Reform, which has been under discussion and
development for several years. This comprehensive rewrite of EPA's
approach to evaluating new sources under the Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (PSD) program will modify, if not sweep away, many of the
historical precedents so lovingly and carefully reviewed in The Clean Air
Act Handbook. But just as Maitland reminded us that "[t]he forms of action
we have buried, but they still rule us from their graves, 26 so too EPA's
" See generally George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J.
ECON. 3 (1971) (arguing that under certain conditions special interests that can concentrate
their resources on particular regulatory provisions may be successful in prevailing over
more general interests).
25 Bernard F. Hawkins, The New Source Review Program: Its Prevention of Significant
Deterioration and Nonattainment Analysis Programs, in THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK
98, 100, 115 (Robert J. Martineau & David P. Novello eds., 1998).
26 F.W. Maitland, Lecture I, in THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 1, 2 (A.H.
Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker, eds., Cambridge U. Press 1963) (1909).
330 [Vol. 5
Book Review
historical precedents and interpretations have a way of exercising
continuing influence long after they have allegedly been "reformed." Thus,
most of what the chapters in The Clean Air Act Handbook teach us will
continue to be relevant; the problem is that they are incomplete, and grow
increasingly more so as time goes on.
Some of the changes were likely anticipated by the authors as they
went to press in 1996. But others probably came as a surprise. For
example, while the author of the NSR chapter could have foreseen NSR
Reform,27 neither he nor anyone else could have foreseen EPA's major new
initiative to enforce the old PSD modification rules against the electric
utility industry, at the same time that another part of the Agency is
proposing to streamline and simplify them.2 ' Nor could he, or anyone else,
have foreseen EPA's recent proposal to eviscerate the "demand growth
exclusion" for electric utilities that the Agency promulgated in 1992,
following the decision in Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v. Reilly, as part of
its post-WEPCO fix. 29 Although The Clean Air Act Handbook carries a
1998 copyright date, if a lawyer in 1998 were to rely on the NSR chapter
in advising an electric utility on what it may or may not do, his or her advice
might be seriously off target.
Again, this is not so much a criticism of the authors, as it is of the
medium-printed books. As an information transfer technology, it is
difficult, if not impossible, for printed books to keep up with the ever-
changing pattern of administrative interpretations and policy adjustments
in an area such as the CAA. 30 Even the traditional mechanism for updating
27 Hawkins, supra note 25, at 115.
28 Draft EPA Policy Lays Out Harsh Punishment for Violators of Air Permit Rules,
INSIDE E.P.A., July 17, 1998, at 1, 6.
29 "WEPCO" refers to a 1990 federal court of appeals decision that struck down what
was EPA's position at the time; that a "like kind" replacement of damaged equipment at an
electric powerplant could trigger the PSD program's requirements for "new" sources.
Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v. Reilly (WEPCO), 893 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1990). EPA
responded with a series of new interpretations, including an exclusion for physical and
operation changes in electric utility plants attributable to system growth in the demand for
electricity. Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation
Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Standards of Performance for
New Stationary Sources, 57 Fed. Reg. 32,314 (July 21, 1992); see Hawkins, supra note 25,
at 98, 100, 115.
30 Lest I be misunderstood, I do not think that books are outdated. In fact, I lovingly
collect books, particularly old books. Some things never change. For example, Erasmus's
observations on human folly are as relevant today as they were in 1550. But EPA's
interpretations of the Clean Air Act are not in this category, and the fast pace of changing
administrative interpretations calls into question whether books as a medium are the most
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printed works, the annual pocket part, is too slow to keep up with the need
for "real time" advice on new regulatory developments.
To their credit, the authors implicitly recognized this shortcoming in
their medium by reprinting, as an appendix to their book, an exceedingly
useful chapter by Lee Hoffman.3 This piece describes how to access the
on-line Web sites and bulletin boards maintained by EPA on which new
guidance documents, preambles, and interpretations are posted by EPA on
an almost daily basis. A second appendix contains a more comprehensive
and up-to-date list of EPA and other Web sites of interest to the air
practitioner.
One wishes The Clean Air Act Handbook had a similar form, as an
interconnected series of expert Web sites. Then experts in rapidly
developing subareas of law, like the authors of each of the chapters in The
Clean Air Act Handbook, could charge a fee and update their work on an
on-going "real time" basis as new developments emerge in the field. This
is, in my opinion, the future of this kind of work.
It has long been said that the age of the great legal treatises is past.
But the rise of the Internet3" creates a niche for a new kind of legal treatise,
one that is continually updated as new developments emerge. It might even
include "jumps" or "links" that automatically move the browser from a
footnote citation of an EPA guidance document to the text of the cited
document.
Thus, The Clean Air Act Handbook truly may be "The Last, Great
Clean Air Act Book."
effective way to collect and transfer this type of data.
3 Lee D. Hoffman, EPA Technology Transfer Network, in THE CLEAN AIR ACt
HANDBOOK 571 (Robert J. Martineau & David P. Novello, eds., 1998). This chapter was
originally published as Database Review: EPA Technology Transfer Network, 3 ENVTL
LAW. 307 (1996).
2 For a general exploration of how the rise of the Internet will change administrative
law, see Stephen M. Johnson, The Internet Changes Everything: Revolutionizing Public
Participation and Access to Government Information Through the Internet, 50 ADMIN. L.
REV. 277 (1998).
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